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THE INDONESIAN MAOISTS: DOCTRINES 
AND PERSPECTIVES 
JUSTUS M. VAN DER KROEF 
1 
In the aftermath of the abortive coup attempt of September 30, 
1965 (usually called Gestapu by acronym-minded Indonesians, 
from Gerakan Tiga Puluh September or "Thirty September 
Movement"), which occurred mainly in Djakarta and Central 
Java, and in which elements of the Indonesian armed forces led 
by "progressive" officers as well as some national and provincial 
leaders and units of youth and women's front groups of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) 
were involved, there emerged a distinctive group of Maoist-
oriented Indonesian Communists. Perhaps two hundred of the 
group reside outside Indonesia, principally in Tirana and Peking; 
these non-residents include students, former cousular and diplo-
matic personnel (like former Indonesian ambassador to the 
People's Republic of China, Djawoto), journalists and other 
professionals. In Indonesia itself, where the PKI has been 
formally banned since 1966, there are several scores of additional 
underground supporters, some of whom have seen active guerilla 
service in the Maoist-oriented, predominantly Chinese "North 
Kalimantan People's Guerilla Forces" (NKPGF) that operates in 
the interior of the Malaysian state of Sarawak near the border of 
Indonesian West Kalimantan (Borneo). 1 Over the years, Peking 
has harbored a "Delegation of the Central Committee" of the PKI, 
headed by Jusuf Adjirorop, a pre-Gestapu Politburo member of the 
PKI, and as Sino-Indonesian diplomatic relations remain sus-
pended (though not formally broken), Chinese media continue to 
give space to official pronouncements of the PKI's based 
"Delegation." Such pronouncements, not surprisingly, urge party 
members (as the most recent PKI anniversary message has it) to 
"truly master the theory of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-tung 
Thought" and denounce the "splittist activities of the Soviet 
social-imperialists."2 
Numerically, the Indonesian Maoists, to a large degree an 
expatriate group at that, would hardly seem to merit much 
consideration. Moreover, in Moscow, India and Sri Lanka there 
1. See the biographical sketches of NKPGF members in the Sarawak Tribune 
(Kuching) March, 10, 1975. 
2. "Continue to Hold Aloft the Banner of Revolution and Strive to Realize 
National Liberation," Peking Review, May 30, 1975, pp. 17-18. 
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are several scores of pro-Soviet PKI exiles and/or sympathizers, 
who have published their particular version of Gestapu and of the 
misfortunes that have befallen their party.3 However, while 
Indonesia's Suharto government has thus far been reluctant to 
join the accelerating momentum now evident among other 
Southeast Asian nations in seeking a new modus vivendi with 
Peking, that momentum itself and the place of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) generally in the new post-Vietnam war 
constellation of Asian internal relations, as well as the persisting 
domestic opposition in Indonesia from the various shades of the 
presently contained, underground, dormant and intimidated 
Indonesian Left (eventually again to be reckoned with, surely, in 
Indonesian politics) suggest that the views of Indonesian Maoists 
need to be better understood. Analyzing their publications, and 
insofar as identifiable, their distinctive tactics during the past 
decade, indicates perhaps three nodal areas of Indonesian Maoist 
concern. The first is the historic course of the Indonesian state 
and the role of the PKI in it, and particularly in relation to the 
Gestapu incident. Second, there is the condition of Indonesia 
today under the Suharto regime, and that regime's foreign 
relations. Finally, there are the present tasks of the PKI both 
organizationally and tactically, in furthering the nation along the 
Maoists' self-perceived revolutionary road. 
I. 
Four major periods of "white terror" (i.e., anti-Communist 
persecution) in a country that remains essentially locked in semi-
feudal conditions, aggravated by imperialistic domination- such 
is the Indonesian Maoist's perception of his national history in 
the past half-century. 
The first "white terror" was that of the Dutch colonial rulers 
of Indonesia; in November 1926, at the time of the PKI's first 
3. For the views of the pro-Soviet PKI group see To Brothers at Home and 
Comrades Abroad Fighting Against Imperialism, For Independence, Peace, 
Democracy and Socialism For a Sound Indonesian Revolution (Tribune Publica-
tions, Columbo, 1967); "Lessons from the Set-Back in Indonesia," Political Affairs 
(CPUSA Theoretical Journal) March, 1968, pp. 49-61; "Urgent Tasks of the 
Communist Movement in Indonesia," Information Bulletin (Prague), 1969, no. 7 
(143), pp. 23-42; Thomas Sinuradja, "The Struggle for Unity. A Few Lessons from 
the History of the CP of Indonesia," World Marxist Review, September, 1973, pp. 
35-37. 
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armed rebellion against them, the Dutch rulers crushed this first 
Indonesian "national armed uprising." Then, in 1948, in the midst 
of the Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch, a "reactionary" 
Indonesian government headed by premier Muhammad Hatta 
and acting "in collusion with the US imperialists," launched a 
second "barbarous white terror" against the party. This occurred, 
it might be added, after a handful of lesser party leaders had 
staged an abortive coup in the East Java city of Madiun. The coup 
attempt illustrated the party's doctrinal and tactical errors during 
the Indonesian Revolution, the Maoists hold. Shattered, though 
not formally outlawed, after Madiun, the party had to experience 
a third "white terror" of arrest and persecution in 1951 during the 
period when a now independent Indonesian Republic was 
governed by a cabinet headed by the conservative Muslim premier 
Sukiman. (This third "white terror" came after ill-considered 
Communist labor agitation and strike action in and around 
Djakarta.) However, these blows, too, the national party survived, 
according to this Maoist version of Indonesian history, just as 
regional PKI organizations were able to overcome, in subsequent 
years, various localized forms of "white terror", unleashed by 
"demestic reactionaries" such as militant Muslim extremists in 
West Java and anti-Sukamo and anti-Communist military 
commanders and political leaders who proclaimed a secessionist 
counter-government in parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi (Celebes) in 
1958. Yet the PKI could not be annihilated, and, during the fifties 
and sixties, was able to develop in a "period of relatively peaceful 
struggle" in a country that had remained "long enough" both 
"semi-independent and semi-feudal." This comparatively "peace-
ful" period of PKI growth, it might be added, coincided with the 
last and most authoritarian phase of President Sukamo's "Guided 
Democracy" rule over Indonesia. But it was also a period, as 
Indonesian Maoist history now holds, when "modem revision-
ism," specifically the policy of achieving socialism peacefully, and 
other forms of "petty bourgeois subjectivism" became dominant in 
the PKI. And thus the stage was set for the disaster that was to 
overtake the party with and in the aftermath of the 1965 Gestapu 
affair, when "right wing forces" headed by a "clique of generals" 
unleashed a fourth "white terror" (or, as some Maoist accounts 
have it, the third "white terror" since Indonesians proclaimed 
their independence on August 17, 1945) against the PKI, 
establishing for the moment a temporarily "superior position in 
comparison with the people's forces." But the struggle goes on, 
and the PKI will undoubtedly ultimately succeed in bringing the 
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Indonesian people to a time when there will be no "oppression by 
imperialism and feudal vestiges."4 
Perhaps the most striking feature in this Indonesian Maoists' 
version of their nation's recent history is not just that the march 
of events is made to pivot primarily on certain distinctive periods 
in which the PKI was persecuted or impeded by an anti-
Communist "white terror." Rather, it is the deepening emphasis 
over the years, in the Maoists' literature on that history, that the 
party basically misunderstood the nature and aftermath of the 
Indonesian Revolution against the Dutch (the "August 1945 
Revolution," as it is commonly called) so that the succession of 
"white terrors" experienced by the party since the 1948 Madiun 
rebellion acquire a kind of historical inevitability. In a collection 
of five principal statements published by the Indonesian Maoists 
in September 1971, this progression in emphasis is particularly 
apparent.5 In the first statement, a May 1966 party anniversary 
message, presumably issued in Djokjakarta, Central Java by the 
party's Politburo, little more is said about PKI errors save a 
passing reference to the fact that during a "relatively peaceful" 
period of party struggle (presumably in the later fifties and 
sixties) the emergence of "revisionism" was facilitated. The 
second statement in the same collection, issued by the Politburo 
on August 17, 1966, the twenty-first anniversary of the outbreak of 
the Indonesian Revolution, offers a new doctrinal focus, however, 
namely the alleged "failure" of the August 1945 revolution, and 
the errors in the PKI party line in relation to it. This failure of the 
August 1945 Revolution is described initially in terms of the 
dissimilar political interests of the social classes in Indonesia 
participating in the anti-colonial struggle. The August 1945 
Revolution, occurring in a period of the decline of capitalism, was 
therefore not "an old-type bourgeois democratic revolution," 
according to this August 17, 1966 statement, but, since its motive 
force was the proletariat and the peasantry, the revolution was 
part of the "anti-imperialist" and "world Proletarian socialist 
4. The above description and citations are drawn from "Let Us Keep the 
Flames of 1945 August Revolution Ablaze - Punish and Smash the Traitors," 
Indonesian Tribune (Tirana) vol. 8, 1974, no. 3, pp. 3-4, and "Hold Aloft the 
Reputation and Honour of the Communist" (May 23, 1966 PKI Politburo Message) 
pp. 3-12 in Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line to Lead the People's 
Democratic Revolution in Indonesia. Five Important Documents of the Political 
Bureau of the CC PKI (published by the Delegation of the CC PKI, Tirana, 1971). 
Indonesian Tribune is the Indonesian Maoists' bi-monthly and principal journal. 
5. Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line ... , op. cit. 
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revolution" now sweeping the world. Nevertheless, the "exploit-
ing" classes, particularly the national bourgeoisie, checked the 
further progress of the August 1945 Revolution once that 
revolution had satisfied the bourgeoisie's own interests, as 
meanwhile the PKI suffering from "serious weakness in theory" 
and lack of understanding of the "concrete conditions" not only 
failed to lead consistently the armed struggle against the Dutch, 
but also "did not develop guerilla warfare that was integrated 
with the democratic movement of the peasants." Indeed, the PKI, 
according to the Maoist view, underplayed such strength as it had 
in order to be able to cooperate with the "Right wing Socialists" 
led by premier Sutan Sjahrir and with the national bourgeoisie, 
thus failing to reach its own "objective goal."6 
This general perception of the August 1945 Revolution as a 
potentially promising proletarian uprising that eventually went 
off the rails because it came under the control of the national 
Indonesian bourgeoisie and "Right wing Socialist" elements with 
which the PKI erroneously attempted to cooperate, has been given 
its fullest refinement to date in the Indonesian Maoists' literature 
in the third document included in their abovementioned collection 
of five principal party statements. This third document is the so-
called otokritik (self-criticism) of the party's Politburo, issued 
presumably from somewhere in "Central Java" in September 
1966.7 The otokritik, the original authorship of which has been 
attributed to Sudisman, a prominent Politburo member who was 
subsequently arrested and executed, is an open attack on the 
theories of PKI chairman D.N. Aidit, who, from the early fifties 
until the 1965 debacle of Gestapu, led the PKI to the greatest 
expansion and influence in its history. Aidit was also killed in 
Gestapu's aftermath. 
Elaborating on the theme of the "embourgeoisement" of the 
August 1945 Revolution, and on the failure of the party to realize 
the Indonesian Revolution's "proletarian" goals, the otokritik 
proceeds to extend the failure of the August 1945 Revolution to the 
settlement with the Dutch that ended the revolution and in fact to 
the entire first decade and a half of Indonesia's formal national 
independence (1950-65) as well. The major accent in the otokritik, 
6. Cf. especially ''Take the Road of Revolution to Realize the Tasks Which 
Should Have Been Accomplished by the 1945 August Revolution," pp. 27-84, in 
Build the PKI Awng the Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit. 
7. The otokritik's title is the same as the title of the collection of five 
important statements in which it appears: Build the PKI Awng the Marxist-
Leninist Line, op. cit., pp. 148-9. 
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however, falls not just on the machinations of the vacillating 
national bourgeoisie and its "reactionary" allies, but more 
especially on a cardinal doctrinal error, attributed to Aidit, which 
doomed the party to disaster and which also had already been 
mentioned, but very briefly, in the August 17, 1966 statement cited 
above. That doctrinal error is the "theory of two aspects in the 
state power" of the Indonesian Republic. According to this theory, 
there was a "people" (or "pro-people") aspect, and an "anti-
people" aspect in the political dynamics of the Indonesian 
Republic during the 1950-65 period. Aidit and the PKI leadership 
are accused in the otokritik of merging the party's line and its 
interests wholly with this so-called "people aspect," even though 
the "people aspect" of state power was, according to the Maoist 
view today, in fact at that time dominated by the untrustworthy 
national bourgeoisie with which the PKI and the proletariat had 
allied itself just as they had done through much of the August 
1945 Revolution. Content to do battle against "the Right wing 
forces or the diehards," i.e., the "anti-people" aspect of state 
power, under a party leadership mired in "opportunism" and one 
that erroneously believed that the "people aspect" of the state 
power had now become ascendant under the progressive policies 
of President Sukamo, the PKI was essentially emasculated 
through this cooperation not only with the national bourgeoisie 
but in effect, also through its identification with Sukamo. As the 
otokritik puts it: 
The Party leadership went so far as to accept without any 
struggle the recognition of Bung Kamo (i.e. Sukamo) as the 
Great Leader of the Revolution and the leader of the "people 
aspect" in the state power of the Republic of Indonesia. In the 
articles and speeches of the party leaders it was frequently 
said that the struggle of the PKI was based not only on 
Marxism-Leninist, but also on the "teachings of Bung 
Kamo" that the PKI made rapid progress because it realised 
Bung Kamo's idea of Nasakom unity (i.e. the unity of 
nationalist, religious and Communist political forces in 
Indonesia). Even the people's democratic system in Indonesia 
was said to be in conformity with Bung Kamo's main ideas 
... Thus the Party leadership did not educate the working 
class and the rest of the working people on the necessity to 
place the leadership of the revolution in the hands of the 
proletariat and their Party, namely the PKI.8 
8. Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit., pp. 148-149. 
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In briefly considering this interpretation of Aidit's two-
aspects concept, one is struck first of all by the irony of the fact 
that the citations in the otokritik to that part of Aidit's writings in 
which Aidit expounds his two-aspect theory must, at least at one 
time, have been acceptable to Maoist purists in People's China 
itself, for these citations are to a collection of Aidit's writings 
which consists largely of addresses given to various audiences in 
the People's Republic of China during Aidit's visit there in 
September, 1963.9 For example, Aidit's elaboration of his two-
aspects theory which the Indonesian Maoists now find so 
displeasing, appears, nota bene, in a lecture by Aidit on the 
subject of the historic course of the Indonesian revolution and on 
the tasks of the PKI related to it, delivered to the Higher Party 
School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
China on September 2, 1963.10 To cap the irony, this particular 
report, along with Aidit's addresses to a mass rally in Peking on 
September 4, 1963, and one to the Kwantung Provincial Commit-
tee Party School in Canton on September 25, 1963, in all of which 
he authoritatively expounds the concept of the "people" (or 
"Popular") and "antipeople" ("anti-popular") aspect of state 
power in Indonesia (the latter representing the "interests of 
imperialism, the compradors, landlords and bureaucrat capital-
ists"), appear in an English language translation published by the 
Foreign Languages Press of Peking .11 
Moreover the otokritik does less than justice to Aidit's own 
ambiguities in his exposition of the two-aspects theory. For 
example, in his September 2, 1963, report to the Chinese Central 
Committee's Higher Party School, Aidit declares that "today" the 
people or "popular" aspect of state power has become "the main 
aspect and plays a leading role in the state power" of the 
Indonesian Republic, while two days later, in his Peking mass 
rally speech, Aidit asserts that the "anti-popular aspect" of 
9. D.N. Aidit, Kibarkan Tinggi Pandji Revolusi (Jajasan Pembaruan, 
Djakarta, 1964). Included also are two addresses given in Pyongyang on 
September 11 and 12, 1963. 
10. Compare, e.g., Aidit's Kibarkan Tinggi Pandji Revolusi, op. cit., pp. 35-37, 
with Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit., pp. 130-132. 
11. D.N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the 
Communist Party of Indonesia (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1964). 
Interestingly, the otokritik does not cite the English title of this Peking edition of 
Aidit's addresses but instead uses an English translation of the Indonesian title 
Kibarkan Tinggi Pandji Revolusi, i.e., "Raise High the Banner of Revolution" (see 
Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit., pp. 206-208, notes 11, 14, 
18, 21, 28, 31, 33). 
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imperialists compradors, landlords, and so on, not only have been 
attempting to frustrate the "progressive policies" but "up to the 
present this aspect still occupies a dominant position," and hence, 
the PKI's task is to struggle in such ways as to enable the 
"popular aspect" to grow so that it can, in fact, achieve a 
dominant position.12 
Then, too, the otokritik, and the position of the Indonesian 
Maoists generally, by implication distort Aidit's appreciation of 
the value of armed struggle and guerilla war. In the Maoists' 
writings, Aidit is made out to be the architect of the "revisionist" 
line of achieving power by parliamentary means. Yet it was Aidit, 
in his mass rally speech at Peking on September 4, 1963, who 
declared that "The August Revolution also taught us that armed 
struggle is the most important struggle in the revolution," and on 
the same occasion sketched the tactics which would "ensure the 
victory of guerilla warfare in an island country like Indonesia."13 
The otokritik also stresses the significance in the course of the 
August 1945 Revolution of a new party policy resolution, entitled 
Djalan Baru untuk Republik Indonesia ("The New Road for the 
Indonesian Republic"), formulated by the veteran Indonesian 
Communist leader Musso when he returned to Indonesia in 1948. 
Ironically, again, considering the Maoists' praise for Musso today, 
Musso had spent his time mostly in the USSR since he had left 
Indonesia nearly twenty-five years previously. The Djalan Baru 
resolution, with its stress on achieving for the PKI a position of 
leadership in the Indonesian revolution and in the national front, 
and on seeing that revolution as a "national" or "bourgeois 
democratic" one with prominent accommodation to be given to 
both bourgeois capitalist and peasant interests, has been 
desc:dbed as "Maoist in nature, if not conciously" "in its 
inspiration," at least "sufficiently similar to the Chinese line."14 
Nevertheless, it would be difficult to eliminate Moscow's hand in 
Musso's return or in his proposed new tactic. As it was, Musso's 
approach, though formally adopted by the PKI's Politburo in 
12. D.N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the 
Communist Party of Indonesia, op. cit., pp. 42 and 85, and Aidit, Kibarkan Tinggi 
Pandji Revolusi, op. cit., pp. 36 and 68-69. 
13. D.N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the 
Communist Party of Indonesia, op. cit., pp. 66 and 69, and D.N. Aidit, Kibarkan 
Tinggi Pandji Revolusi op. cit., pp. 54, 56-57. 
14. Ruth T. McVey, The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution (Modern 
Indonesia Project, Interim Reports Series, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1957), 
p. 66. 
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August 1948, came to naught because of the precipitate Commu-
nist rebellion in Madiun a few weeks later (which Musso almost 
certainly opposed.) The point is that the otokritik, by creating the 
impression that the PKI under Aidit somehow strayed from the 
norms set earlier by the Djalan Baru resolution, patently ignores 
again not only the continuation of many Djalan Baru concepts in 
party ideology and tactics later employed by Aidit in the 1950's 
(e.g., the supportive roles of peasantry and bourgeoisie in the 
revolutionary struggle, and the concept of "bourgeois democratic 
revolution"), but also the explicit approval given by Aidit of 
Musso's ideas and of the Djalan Baru resolution itself, which, 
becoming the basis of the PKI's "new policy," according to Aidit, 
"made possible the development of a new upward momentum in 
the Indonesian Revolution."15 
The position of the otokritik then, and of the Maoists 
generally, on the alleged extended "failures" of the August 
Revolution into the 1950's and early 1960's as a result of a party 
line adverse to militancy, confrontation and armed struggle, and 
presumably too "opportunistically" accommodating to bourgeois 
leadership and to President Sukarno, does some violence to the 
historical record, certainly insofar as Aidit was concerned. It was, 
after all, Aidit who anticipated criticism that collaboration with 
the bourgeoisie in the "pro-people" dynamics of the state might 
work to the party's and Indonesia's ultimate disadvantage. For in 
his Peking rally speech of September 4, 1963 (a speech deemed 
sufficiently pure doctrinally to be disseminated in English 
translation by Peking's Foreign Languages Press, it may be 
reiterated), Aidit said16; 
"Some comrades have asked: Are these progressive political 
and economic plans not tricks used by the bourgeoisie to 
deceive the working people? This is not a strange question. 
But the point is that these progressive plans have come about 
through the growth of the progressive forces which have 
taken an active part in drawing them up . . . all the 
progressive plans and measures adopted by the present 
government are primarily the result of the struggle of 
Indonesia's progressive forces. The fact that the whole nation 
15. See, e.g., Aidit's essay, "Lahimja PKI dan Perkembangannja," pp. 423-426, 
in Aidit's collected works, Pilihan Tulisan (Jajasan Pembaruan Djakarta, 1959), 
vol. 1. 
16. D.N. Aidit, The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the 
Communist Party of Indonesia, op. cit., p. 86, and D.N. Aidit Kibarkan Tinggi 
Pandji Revolusi, op. cit., p. 69. 
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has accepted the plan of the working class and its party 
reflects the working class leadership in the revolution". 
The culmination of the PKI's allegedly erroneous line under 
Aidit, in the Indonesian Maoists' perception today, was the 
party's participation in the Gestapu coup attempt. This participa-
tion resulted from overconfidence in the party's strength (a "leftist 
tendency," according to the otokritik), and from an "exaggeration 
of the results of the people's struggle," which led the PKI 
leadership in the course of 1965 to believe, according to the party's 
forty-fifth anniversary thesis, in a "ripening revolutionary 
situation" in the country.17 Whether the Maoist perception is the 
right one, and the PKI, in fact, had become overconfident in its 
strength as a result of Sukamo's seemingly ever more militant 
foreign policies as domestic economic chaos deepened, may well 
long be argued. The point to note here, however, is that the 
Indonesian Maoists (and indeed their pro-Soviet opponents in the 
Indonesian Communist movement as well) concede direct PKI 
involvement in the attempted Gestapu coup. The readiness with 
which Indonesian Communists of whatever hue admit such 
involvement seems at variance from the position of some Western 
academic commentators on the Gestapu affair who appear to seek 
to minimize PKI involvement as much as possible, or else assert 
that the party was somehow duped into participation in the 
attempted coup.18 In contrast, the otokritik asserts, for example, 
that as a result of their overconfident "adverturism," the PKI 
leaders "easily involved themselves" in the Gestapu conspiracy.19 
The presumed author of the otokritik, former Politburo member 
Sudisman, according to his trial record published in a Communist 
journal, excluded the PKI as such from culpability for the coup 
attempt; yet he added that in respect of Gestapu "all actions were 
executed by individuals who happened to be members ofthe PKI," 
and that, moreover, the aims of the coup planners and "the 
objectives of the 30th September movement were correct."20 
17. Tesis 45 Tahun PKI, 23 Mei 1920-23 Mei 1965 (Jajasan Pembaruan, 
Djakarta 1965) p. 15. Parts of this thesis are cited in Build the PKI Along Marxist-
Leninist Line, op. cit., pp. 160-161. 
18. For various views of Gestapu see by J.M. van der Kroef, "Interpretations of 
the 1965 Indonesian Coup: A Review of the Literature," Pacific Affairs, Winter 
1970-71, pp. 557-577, and "Origins of the 1965 Coup in Indonesia: Probabilities and 
Alternatives," Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, September 1972, pp. 277-298. 
19. Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit., p. 88. 
20. "Sudisman Against Treason," Tricontinental, July-August, 1968, no. 7, pp. 
18-19. Tricontinental is self-described as the "theoretical organ of the Executive 
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Inter alia, one notes also that in the most authoritative self-
evaluation that has thus far been published by the PKI-Moscow 
faction one reads that the coup attempt aimed at establishing "a 
state power that would be a harbinger of a people's democracy," 
and a spokesman of that faction, writing in the main interna-
tional organ of Moscow-oriented Communist parties, has reiter-
ated that the aim of the Gestapu movement was to bring together 
Indonesian nationalists, Muslims and Communists in a "Revolu-
tionary Council" which would be "a preliminary to People's 
Democracy. "21 
While, even so, the extent of PKI participation in the coup (as 
distinct from the PKI having participated at all) is likely to 
remain controversial in various quarters, for the Indonesian 
Maoists, as for their "revisionist," Moscow-oriented opponents, 
Gestapu marked the inevitable climax of doctrinal errors and self-
compromising tactics which, in the Maoist perception, the PKI 
pursued for better than a decade and a half, and which, in turn, 
stemmed also from the failure of Indonesia's August 1945 
Revolution. 
Since the publication of the September 1966 otokritik, 
authoritative statements of the Indonesian Maoists have reas-
serted the failure of the August 1945, Revolution, and of the PKI 
erroneous line in the next decade and a half under Aidit's 
leadership, as something given - a defined doctrinal position no 
longer in need of further explanation, but only in need of constant 
affirmation in policy pronouncements. Thus, in the words of one 
Indonesian delegate to an Albanian trade union congress in 1967, 
the Indonesian workers and people, having failed to "take the 
correct road in their revolution," i.e., "they took the peaceful 
road," now must suffer "the bitter consequences," and will have to 
undergo "untold hardships," for experience has shown that 
"taking the peaceful road is tantamount to taking the road to 
suicide" and defeat. 22 During the 1951-65 period, one reads in a 
1970 editorial in the Indonesian Maoists' main journal, that the 
Secretariat of the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America," headquartered in Havana. Sudisman's statement, according to a 
note by Tricontinental's editors, came to them "thanks to honorable people" who 
were present at Sudisman's trial. 
21. To Brothers at Home and Comrades Abroad, op. cit. (see note 3) p. 38; 
Suchahyo, "The 'New Order' in Indonesia," World Marxist Review, 1967 vol. 10, 
no. 10, p. 47. 
22. Setiati Surasto, ''The Peaceful Road is the Suicidal Road," Indonesian 
Tribune, April-May 1970. 
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PKI leadership pursued a path of "Right opportunism," while, 
simultaneously, "revisionist" influence made itself felt in their 
party. This "opportunist-revisionist" tactic did immense harm to 
the PKI, as well as to the course of the unfinished Indonesian 
Revolution. The emergence of the Suharto "fascist regime" today, 
is, again, viewed as directly linked to the erroneous party line of 
the previous decade and a half. 23 In another editorial, in 1974, the 
party's failure in the August 1945 Revolution and beyond is 
considered in terms of control of state power. In other words, the 
people, having seized in the revolution the "old state machinery," 
which did not meet the requirements of the revolution, neverthe-
less "never challenged" that machinery's "continued use," and so 
did not replace it with an entirely new state power mechanism 
that could serve the people's own revolutionary ends. Conse-
quently, the "reactionaries" were able to play the role of a "Trojan 
horse" and to undermine the Indonesian nation's revolutionary 
course.24 Such short categorical characterisations of Indonesia's 
first twenty years of national revolution and independence (1945-
65) are being repeatedly made in the Indonesian Maoist literature, 
sometimes with an occasional embellishment of historic detail, 
but always with an eye to providing an ideological rational for the 
party's present predicament in Suharto's Indonesia, and for the 
presumably new tactics which must be developed in order to 
remedy Indonesia's present condition. Before considering these 
new tactics, the plight of Indonesians and their country in the 
present Suharto era, as the Maoists see it, must be briefly noted. 
II. 
"Fascist general Suharto ascended to power by way of a 
counter-revolutionary coup d'etat- one which was backed by US 
imperialism and directly masterminded by the CIA. No wonder 
that the fascist regime he has set up in Indonesia has been 
praised to the skies by world imperialism!" - so one reads in the 
lead article of a recent publication of the "Indonesian Students' 
Association in Albania." In the Maoists' dialectic vision, the 
Suharto regime, as the present antithetical climax in Indonesia's 
presumably ongoing revolution, is held to be exemplified by a 
whole catalogue of deeply nefarious policies. There is, for example, 
the allegedly continuing "selling out" by the Suharto government 
23. Editorial, "Long Live The Communist Party of Indonesia," Indonesian 
Tribune, vol. 4, 1970, no. 2 p. 4. 
24. Editorial, "Let Us Keep the Flames of the 1945 August Revolution Ablaze 
- Punish and Smash the Traitors!" Indonesian Tribune, vol. 8, 1974, no. 3, p. 5. 
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of Indonesia's natural resources to the "imperialism" of foreign 
investors, particularly to the US. It is, however, not just the flow 
of foreign investment (now nearly $4 billion) to Indonesia, or the 
ever growing number of foreign enterprises in the country ("While 
prior to Suharto's seizure of power in 1965 there were only three oil 
companies operating in Indonesia, there are now 48, with US and 
Japanese firms topping the list"), that arouse the Maoists' ire. It is 
more especially also the opportunities presumably being provided 
to nepotistic, rapacious, "Indonesian bureaucrat capitalists," who, 
acting as fronts for foreign capital interests, continue to enrich 
themselves. Thus, while President Suharto himself has no 
business interests, "his wife Tien Suharto ... is a go-between for 
foreign oil companies and the tourist business" acquiring "no 
small" commissions for her services. There is, according to the 
Indonesian Maoists, also Mme. Tien Suharto's "close criminal 
relationship" with General lbnu Sutowo, the former director-
general of Indonesia's embattled, state-owned oil company 
Pertamina, who has become "a financial prop for the survival of 
fascist rule" and who, along with other Indonesian generals, is 
accused of participating in various business enterprises with 
foreign concerns, and so on. 25 
In the Maoist perception, the economy of Suharto's Indonesia 
has become the pawn of "imperialist" investment interests, and 
the regime's national Five Year Development Plans merely serve 
to widen the exploitative opportunities to these foreign monied 
interests. Inevitably, in this view, the "rush of foreign capital" to 
Indonesia has been accompanied by the immiseration of the 
Indonesian masses, characterized, among others, by the bank-
ruptcy of "large numbers" of domestic enterprises and a growing 
mass unemployment for which supporting data are cited in the 
Maoists' literature drawn from the Indonesian press itself. 26 
Indonesian Maoist accounts are especially critical of the huge 
loans and other aid extended by the so called Inter-Governmental 
Group on Indonesia, or IGGI, a consortium composed of 
Indonesia's major creditors and investors, among them the US, 
Japan, and a number of Western European countries, as well as 
international banking institutions like the World, Bank, the IMF 
25. Preceding quotations from Api (API Pemuda Indonesai), Tirana, October 
1972, pp. 1-2. 
26. See, e.g., the "Delegation" of the PKI's Central Committee statement on 
the occasion of the party's forty-ninth anniversary (May 23, 1969) in Indonesian 
Tribune, vol. 3 (1969), no. 2, p. 42 and "Indonesia's Economy Further Deteriorates," 
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 3, 1969, no. 4, p. 43. 
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and the Asia Development bank. The nearly $8 billion pumped by 
the IGGI into Indonesia since 1967 to stabilize and rehabilitate 
the Indonesian economy after the Sukamo period, is criticized by 
the Maoists, among other reasons, because of (1) the staggering, 
even if long term, debt burden imposed on Indonesia because of 
the IGGI assistance, thus tying its resources ever closer to the 
capitalist bloc of nations and their economic policies, (2) the "open 
door policy with regard to foreign capital" required of the Suharto 
regime because of the IGGI arrangement (already in September, 
1972 a total of $1.8 billion in foreign investment projects had been 
approved, according to the Indonesian Maoists, and since then 
that figure has grown), (3) the "dumping" of foreign commodities 
"in immense quantities" on the Indonesian market, ranging from 
cars to tooth-picks, (4) the special "tax holidays" granted by 
Suharto to foreign investors, which, because of unfair advantage, 
have pressed hard on national enterprises and which have led to 
"steadily increasing" bankruptcies among them, (5) the require-
ment that projects built with IGGI aid utilize the services of 
technicians and equipment purchased from the creditor country, 
(6) that the food aid received from the US must be paid for at 
prices usually higher than the world market price, and so on. 27 
In a recent review of the Indonesian economy, the Indonesian 
Tribune charged that under the_ Suharto regime rice prices had 
skyrocketed28 (e.g., by 20% in November, 1974 alone), but that 
the increase had primarily benefited the "parasites' profiteering 
interests" which are being protected by the present Indonesian 
government. The general weakness of the Indonesian economy, 
including the combined effects of recession and inflation in the 
Western countries, is viewed by the Indonesian Maoists as a 
primary reason for the new warmth in Soviet-Indonesian 
relations. The attempts by Indonesia to secure increased Soviet 
assistance will, however, but perpetuate the present "semi-colonial 
and semi-feudal" character of Indonesian society. The reason for 
this is that no important structural and policy changes have 
occurred in the Suharto regime's policies. Thus the Soviets, to the 
extent that they are assisting Indonesia, are not only perpetuating 
the allegedly reactionary character of the present Indonesian 
27. "The Suharto Regime and the IGGI Aid," Indonesian Tribune, Vol. 6, 1972, 
No. 4, pp. 10-14. On August 16, 1975 Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik said that 
Indonesia had received more than $3.7 billion in soft-term loans thus far, and that 
nearly $2 billion in further soft-term loans had been promised. 
· 28. "Behind Adam Malik's Visit to Moscow," pp. 19-21, and "Indonesian 
Situation in 1974 Reviewed," p. 25, in Indonesian Tribune, vol. 9, no. 1, 1975. 
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government, but, also, the new Soviet aid program to Indonesia is 
likely to lead to "fiercer superpower contention" between Ameri-
can and Soviet competing interests. The Indonesian Maoists also 
believe that under the circumstances the Soviet Union will 
collaborate with the Indonesian government against "the Indone-
sian revolutionary movement." As a Third World country 
Indonesia cannot possibly have any real interest in perpetuating 
its own relationship with the Soviet Union. This is the message 
which the Indonesian Maoists seek to articulate. The USSR thus 
becomes but a participant in the current historic phase of 
continuing colonial and feudal domination of the Indonesian 
people. While the principal burden for all this rests upon the US, it 
is clearly the Indonesian Maoists' intention to link Russian policy 
toward Indonesia, and by implication in Southeast Asia as a 
whole to American interests and designs. 
Above all in the implementation of economic aid policies "US 
imperialism," according to the Indonesian Maoists, has seen to it 
that it has its Indonesian "trusted flunkeys" - a group of US 
trained or sympathizing economists and public administrators -
jocularly referred to as the "Berkley Mafia"- in key positions, so 
as to be able to keep Indonesia in America's "neo-colonial 
clutches."29 The effects of foreign economic influence, allegedly, 
have been particularly harrowing for the mass of Indonesians. 
For example, the "pillage" of fish resources of the Indonesian 
seas, particularly by Japanese (who are also accused of "pillag-
ing" the nation's oil resources) has destroyed the livelihood of 
Indonesian fishermen; the "merciless rapine" of Indonesia's forest 
resources by foreign timber firms (US, French and Japanese) who 
have been given "three million hectares" in forest land conces-
sions, according to the Maoists, gravely threatens small holders' 
agriculture; and the impact of foreign capital, in any case, has not 
benefited the peasantry, as vast imports of rice remain necessary 
(e.g., in 1970 680,000 tons had to be imported) and frequent food 
shortages and even famine keep breaking out.30 National-capital 
owned enterprises, e.g., textile mills and the cigarette industry, 
unable to compete with foreign enterprises backed by corrupt' 
officials and adverse business controls, increasingly face "ruina-
29. "On Suharto's Fascist Regime's Total Dependence on Imperialist 'Aids'," 
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 6, 1972, no. 1, pp. 13-17. 
30 "Foreign Capital Brings the Indonesian People to Rack and Ruin," 
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 5, 1971, no. 1, pp. 33-34. 
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tion," and in turn aggravate the "massive unemployment" in the 
country.at All the Suharto government's policies have done little 
to stop the ruinous rate of inflation, which according to one 
Indonesian Maoist analysis, is exemplified by the fact that in the 
beginning of 1967 the price of rice was 10 Rupiah per kilogram 
and by 1973 it had risen to 150 Rupiah, as, meanwhile, according 
to official Indonesian sources cited in the Maoist publication, the 
cost of living index rose in Indonesia by more than 20% during the 
1972-73 period.a2 · 
Given its tactical and doctrinal position, the PKI's Maoist 
wing naturally has paid particular attention to the allegedly 
worsening plight of the Indonesian peasantry over the years. The 
Suharto regime is charged with permitting Indonesian landlords 
"under the protection of the gun and bayonet" to "snatch back" 
lands previously distributed to the peasant smallholders under 
agrarian and land reform measures in vogue prior to 1965. Thus, 
while in 1962-63, before Suharto assumed power, the average area 
of land owned by the individual peasant was 0. 75 hectare, in 1972 
that area had shrunk to only 0.25 hectare, and an estimated 7 
million hectares of peasant land may be considered as having 
been "grabbed by the regime of Suharto." Then, too, foreign 
assistance projects in agriculture, such as expansion of irrigation 
facilities and construction of dams, though requiring labor 
services by the smallholder, ultimately primarily benefit the 
landlord-landowner. The rural laborer's wages remain abysmally 
low (i.e., 8 US cents a day), and "large numbers of peasants" are 
allegedly compelled under the Suharto regime even to perform 
"unpaid" or "slave" labor in government rural development 
projects, as well as in the transport of state property and of 
commodities appropriated by "local fascist chieftains" engaged in 
smuggling and bartering.aa 
Finally, to complete this sketch of life in Suharto's Indonesia 
as perceived by the Maoists, there is the alleged trampling of 
political rights in the country today. The victory of the govern-
ment's Golkar (from Golongan Karya of "Functional Group") 
party in the parliamentary election of July 3, 1971, was achieved 
only because, allegedly, the Suharto government could and did 
resort to "every conceivable means - subtle secret, as well as 
31. Ibid. p. 35. 
32. API (API Pemuda Indonesia), 1973 (no volume or issue number), pp. 4-5. 
33. Adhiguna, "Notes on Ruthless Fleecing of Indonesian Peasants," Indone-
sian Tribune, vol. 5, 1971, no. 3, pp. 11-12. 
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crude and violent" in ensuring Golkar's success at the polls. 
Coercion, threats and intimidation, amplified through the use of 
the whole public administrative apparatus of the state and by 
large sums of money, were routine government tactics, according 
to the Maoists, and the Indonesian press itself, e.g., the Djakarta 
daily Pedoman, is cited to buttress charges of "excesses" in the 
government's campaign and of "violations of fundamental human 
rights."34 In a statement issued by the Maoist "Delegation" ofthe 
PKI Central Committee, the Indonesian people were urged to 
oppose the "farce" of the July 1971 elections and instead to 
espouse "revolutionary armed struggle" as the only road to 
national liberation.35 Political repression in Indonesia, according 
to the Maoists, is also exemplified by the periodic banning and 
suspension of newspapers and by the arrests of journalists, so 
that the remaining legal newspapers are forced "to use Aesopian 
language" if they wish to criticize the government.36 
Last but not least, there is the problem of political prisoners 
(estimated at over 300,000 in 1970 by one Maoist writer) who are 
subjected to "horrifying atrocities and starvation" by the Suharto 
regime. Indonesian Maoist sources particularly note that, also in 
foreign quarters, there has been concern over the plight of some 
10,000 political prisoners on the island of Buru, in Eastern 
Indonesia. Buru has, in fact, become a "hell island," where 
prisoners suspected of subversion, but against whom there is not 
enough evidence to warrant a trial, are allegedly compelled into 
forced labor and subject to a gruelling work routine with little 
food. 37 
What is one to make of this catalogue of horrors? A careful 
consideration of the Maoists' charges, shorn of their exaggeration, 
ideological jargon and hyperbole, reveals a hard nubbin of truth. 
This is not the place to review the state of Indonesia's economy 
and development planning since Suharto came to power in 1966. 
However, one can note the range of non-Communist press and 
34. "The 'General Election' A Boomerang for Suharto," Indonesian Tribune, 
vol. 6, 1972, no. 3, pp. 8-10. 
35. "Statement of the Delegation of PKI Central Committee. People of 
Indonesia Unite to Oppose Suharto Fascist Regime's 'General Election' Farce," 
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 5, 1971, no. 2, pp. 7-9. 
36. "Is There a Free Press in Indonesia?," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 7, 1973, no. 
3-4, pp. 21-22. 
37. T. Amirun, "The Death-Concentration Camps of Buru Island," Indonesian 
Tribune, vol. 4, 1970, no. 1, pp. 13-16 and "Fascist Barbarity Coated with Cloak of 
'Humanitarianism'," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 8, 1974, no. 1, pp. 18-20. 
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other reports in recent years stressing the serious corruption in the 
grievous inequalities in the income and benefits flowing from 
Suharto's "new order."3B The Indonesian press itself, in editorial 
comments, has noted that "the fact is that poverty is still a main 
characteristic feature of our people, but a small group of them live 
extravagantly"; that the "monthly income of the majority of the 
people as revealed by Minister Suatami ... is below Rp 7000 or 
US $17.00; and that "What one sees today, however, is the revival 
of the old corrupt mentality as manifested by the prevalence of 
corrupt practices, abuses of authority, extravagances by the 'elite 
of society,' and poverty among the majority."39 One authoritative 
report in May 1975 on Indonesia's economy also notes next to 
some bright spots in long-term development projects that: 
"Unemployment is rampant. Incomes are woefully inadequate. 
The nation's wealth is unevenly distributed; a recent oil bonanza 
still has to create meaningful changes in the living standards of 
its 130 million people,'' and also that while the catastrophic 
inflation rate of 650% in 1965-66 was reduced to less than 10% in 
the early 1970's, today "price indices are flying high again on two 
digit figures."40 The expropriation of the country's economic· 
assets by "foreign business interests," while benefits to Indone-
sians are "confined to a small governing elite,'' is acknowledged 
by non-Indonesian commentators to be a source of concern among 
Indonesians, especially the students, and it is noteworthy that 
after intense student protests in Djakarta on January 15 and 16, 
1974 against Japanese but also other foreign economic power 
interests, the Suharto government promulgated various measures 
favoring the enterprises of indigenous Indonesians.41 
Then, too, the plight of the Indonesian peasant smallholder 
has been repeatedly stressed by non-Communist sources, although 
the latter observe different causes of the rural misery than are 
found in the Maoist literature. The decline in the size of 
38. "Corruption Angers Indonesian Students," The New York Times, January 
22, 1974; "In Indonesia, Luxury Amid Poverty," The New York Times, January 27, 
1974; "In Indonesia Wealth Flows In but Masses Don't Get Much of It," The Wall 
Street Journal, February 26, 1974; "Corruption Saps the Vitality of Oil Rich 
Indonesia," The Bangkok Post, June 30, 1975. 
39. Editorials, The Djakarta Times, November 14 and 27, 1973. 
40. "Indonesia: Coping with the Past and the Present," Insight (Hong Kong) 
May 1975, p. 28. 
41. Quarterly Economic Review: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Indonesia 
(London) no. 1, 1974, p. 2, and "lndonesianisation and Wider Participation of 
Indigenous Indonesians in Enterprises," Monthly Review (Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Djakarta), January-February, 1974, pp. 4-11. 
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landholdings, owing to steady population pressure, is as demon-
strable as the deepening peasant poverty, and the steady growth 
of a rural proletariat in Java has now reached the point, in the 
view of one observer, where ''literally thousands of landle2s 
families crisscross the Javanese countryside, following the 
harvest from West to East and then returning for the next season 
as the paddy (rice) starts to yellow on the fields agains"42 - a 
clear worsening of what the present writer has called Java's 
"scavenger economy." Whatever the achievements in economic 
stabilization of the Suharto government, deepening rural poverty 
is a reality in Indonesia, and the Indonesian Maoists' tactical 
focus on the peasant and rural proletariat cannot be faulted. 
Finally, in the area of political liberties the charges of the 
Maoists, despite their verbal rhodomontades, are also basically 
correct. The July 1971 election may not have been a "farce," but 
independent observers and even highly placed officials in the 
Suharto government itself have conceded extensive intimidation 
and coercion oi Golkar's opponents, numerous pressures on the 
civil bureaucracy, and, to ensure the success of the government's 
party candidates, extensive use of the financial and public 
administrative r~sources of the state on behalf of the Golkar, and 
so on.43 The condition of the press to be sure is, in reality, a good 
deal more free than Maoist criticism makes it out to be. 
Nevertheless, dailies are frequently suspended, journalists are 
hailed before the authorities, certain newspapers known to reflect 
the Golkar or armed forces' position are facilitated in their 
circulation through government agencies, especially in the islands 
beyond Java, and the relative lack of press freedom in Indonesia 
has been the object of official concern by international journalistic 
and press bodies. And while the living condition of the political 
prisoners on Buru island has greatly impr:>ved over the years, 
that of those being held in other priso.:tl3 (all said to be 
42. Richard William Franke, The :;reen Revolution in a Javanese Village 
(unpublished Ph D. thesis, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., June 1972), p. 
181. Also cited in William L. Collier et al., Tebasan HYV's and Rural Change: An 
Example in Java (Agro Economic Survey of Indonesia s. 1, November 1973 
mimeo), pp. 2-3. See also William Collier, Villagers' Employment, Sources of 
Income, Use of High Yielding Varieties and Ji'arm Laborers in the Major Rice-
Producing Regions of Indonesia (Agro Economic Survey s. 1, June 1972), and D.H. 
Penny and S. Singarimbun, Population and Poverty in Rural Java: Some 
Economic Arithmetic from Sriharjo (Department of Agricultural Economics, 
Cornell University, May, 1973). 
43. See, e.g., B.B. Hering and G.A Willis, The Indonesian General Election of 
1971 (Centre d'Etude du Sud-Est Asiatique et de I' Extreme Orient, Brussels, 1973). 
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Communists or Gestapu participants or supporters) has not, and 
the fact remains, as an international non-Communist organisa-
tion concerned with the problem of political prisoners has noted, 
that in 1974 over 55,000 political prisoners were still being held in 
Indonesia "all detained without charge or trial since 1965."44 The 
Suharto government, because of increasing concern from non-
Communist quarters throughout the world, has shown considera-
ble sensitivity to the problem of the prisoners, thousands of whom 
the government in fact admits cannot be brought to trial because 
of insufficient evidence, yet keeps on holding in custody presuma-
bly for "rehabilitation." Again, in focusing their criticism of the 
Suharto regime in terms of the prisoner issue the Indonesian 
Maoists are keeping a wide, including non-Communist company 
throughout the world. 
Considered tactically, then, the Maoists have chosen their 
targets well in their attacks on the Suharto regime. This is not 
however, the same thing as saying that the method of attack, i.e., 
the particular verbal rationale accompanying or sustaining the 
attack,. would find the same broad-gauge or international 
adhesion. Nor does it mean that the Indonesian Maoist analysis 
observes any objectivity or balance, since it denies that there are 
or excludes from consideration any positive features of the 
Suharto administration. It does mean, however, that Indonesian 
Maoists, in developing their criticism of Suharto's domestic 
policies, have sharply focused on generally agreed upon points of 
vulnerability of the present Indonesian government. The same 
cannot be said, however, of the Indonesian Maoist assessments of 
the Suharto regime's foreign policies. Compared to the relative 
tactical realism of their attacks in the domestic sphere, Indone-
sian Maoist analysis of Indonesia's current international rela-
tions appears to have totally surrendered to ideological preconcep-
tions, ignoring the flexibility and self-searching pragmatism not 
just of the Djakarta government, but also that of its Southeast 
Asian neighbors in this post-Vietnam war and big power detente 
era. 
Insofar as Indonesian foreign policy is concerned, the Maoist 
literature and policy positions appear to revolve - next to routine 
praise for and congratulatory statements sent to "fraternal" 
parties like the Chinese and Albanian parties, or to the Malaysian 
insurgents or the Peking-oriented wing of the Philippine Commu-
nist party - around three issues, all essentially dealing with the 
44. Amnesty International Annual Report, 1973-74 (published by Amnesty 
International, London, 1974), p. 52. 
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role of three big powers, the USSR, the US, and PRC. References 
to Japan do appear, but primarily in the context of its "imperial-
ist" economic expansion in Southeast Asia. References to the 
global J:"ole of Western Europe are non-existent, and there has thus 
far appeared relatively little (and that little is usually negative) on 
the growth of Southeast Asian regionalism, on a possible 
"neutralization" of Southeast Asia, or on the future of ASEAN 
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations, founded in 1967, and 
comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and the 
Philippines). 
Paramount in the Indonesian Maoist literature are the 
allegedly aggressive Soviet policies toward Indonesia. Although 
virtually all independent observers agree that in the aftermath of 
the Gestapu incident and the subsequent execution of suspected 
Communist leaders in Indonesia, Soviet-Indonesian relations 
became notably strained - a strain aggravated by Indonesia's 
huge $990 million debt to the Soviets at about the time of the 
Gestapu incident45 - and only in the last three years have begun 
to improve again, in the Indonesian Maoist perception Russian 
policies have, since the advent of the Suharto regime in 1966, been 
designed to "give a shot in the arm" to Sukarno's successors, 
described by Maoists as "those murderers of thousands of 
Indonesian patriots and innocent people."46 According to this 
perception, the USSR has supplied arms and ammunition to the 
Suharto regime, attempted to enhance its own trade opportunities 
with the regime from its inception, and even tried to build "a 
somewhat anti-imperialist image of the fascist regime" of Suharto 
by portraying that regime as being reluctant to follow US policies. 
The concept of US-USSR collusion in developing aggressive 
policies in Asia was particularly explored in 1969 in one 
Indonesian Maoist publication. There it was charged that the 
Nixon Doctrine, L'lsofar as Asia was concerned, meant primarily a 
variant of the old Dullesian line of letting "Asians fight Asians," 
and that it, like the Soviets' proposed collective security system for 
Asia, served primarily the purpose of encircling the PRC.47 
Particularly recurrent in the Maoist literature has been the 
theme that through their "revisionist splitting" policies in the 
45. J. Panglaykim and H.W. Arndt, The Indonesian Economy, Facing A New 
Era? (Rotterdam University Press, 1966), p. 12, Table 1. 
46. R. Djuwari, "Soviet Policy Toward Indonesia. More Insidious than US 
Policy," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 2, 1968, no. 6-7, p. 17-19. 
47. "US Imperialist-Soviet Social Imperialist Plot of Aggression in Asia," 
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 3, 1969, no. 4, pp. 26-28, 41. 
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Indonesian "Revolutionary movement," through projecting the 
false image of a Chinese threat to Indonesia, and through 
attempts to portray the Suharto "fascist regime" as "anti-
imperialist" and "neutral," the Soviets persist in helping Suharto, 
as, meanwhile, they also "peddle" their "revisionist prescription 
of suicide" to the Indonesian people that Indonesians should 
pursue a peaceful and parliamentary course.48 
The new Sino-US detente in the Nixon era and the winding 
down of overt US military commitments in Indo-China, have done 
little or nothing to change the Indonesian Maoist perception of the 
US "imperialist" threat in Asia generally and in Indonesia in 
particular. Attacks on SEATO (the Southeast Asian Treaty 
Organization) and on US mutual defense policies have continued 
over the years in the Indonesian Maoist publications, although 
SEA TO's recent decline is noted even as the continuing similarity 
between US "imperialism" and Soviet "social imperialism" is 
underscored. ASEAN is placed in the same category as SEATO 
and ANZUS (the US-Australian-New Zealand mutual defense 
treaty) as being but another "military pact" that was "concocted" 
by the US, but that now is "crumbling." 
According to the Indonesian Maoist perception, it is the PRC 
that is the principle bastion of the "peoples and nations of the 
whole world" against the allegedly subversive and hegemony 
seeking policies of the two "superpowers," the US and the USSR.49 
This position must obviously qualify the extent to which the 
Indonesian Maoists are prepared to endorse the thaw between the 
PRC and the US since the inception of the Nixon era. Since the 
PRC, de facto, is relying on the US as a "potential balancer" in 
the relations of the superpowers, the alleged alliance between 
Soviet "social imperialism" and American "imperialism" cannot 
be pushed too far. The way out of this dilemma at least for the 
Indonesian Maoists is not to attack Sino-US detente, but rather to 
attack the vestigal influences exercised by the US in Thailand, the 
Philippines and increasingly more directly in Indonesia. Both 
SEATO, formally to fade out of existence before the middle of 
1977, and American's support, tacitly but real, of the ASEAN 
strategic potential serve the Indonesian Maoists as a convenient 
whipping post. It thus becomes possible to continue to attack the 
lingering American military presence in Asia while not criticizing 
48. "Soviet Social·lmperialists Exert Tremendous Efforts to Prop Up Suharto 
Fascist Regime," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 8, 1974, no. 2, pp. 10-15. 
49. Peking Review, July 30, 1976, p. 23. 
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the role which that presence plays in China's own strategic 
posture toward the Soviet Union. To the extent that it is possible 
to link the Suharto regime with the lower profile American 
military policy in Asia, today it serves the Indonesian Maoists 
interests to continue to attack Washington style "imperialism" 
also. 
Even as the PRC was gradually moving toward qualified 
endorsement of the concept originally advanced by the ASEAN 
powers in 1971 that the Southeast Asian region be declared a 
"zone of peace, freedom and neutrality," free from the interference 
of other powers, the Indonesian Maoists were denouncing that 
ideal as but a "new veil" behind which US "imperialism" and its 
"puppets," like the Suharto government, would seek to continue 
their machinations.50 Suharto's neutrality and non-alignment 
claims have been particularly excoriated in the Indonesian Maoist 
media "unneutral neutrality," as it is put), and while, eventually, 
a less openly anti-ASEAN position may well be adopted by those 
media, yet so long as the present freeze in Sino-Indonesian 
diplomatic relations between Peking and Djakarta persists 
(relations were suspended, though not fc:1mally broken in 1967, in 
the wake of rising tensions between the two countries following 
the Gestapu incident), Suharto's professed adherence to ASEAN 
policy aims of neutrality is likely to be attacked. The keynote of 
this Indonesian Maoist approach became again apparent in 1972, 
in a comment in the Indonesian Tribune on recent discussions 
between Suharto and Japanese special envoy Kiichi Aichi in 
Djakarta. These discussions were designed to brief the Indonesian 
government on the irr.pending "normalization" of Sino-Japanese 
diplomatic relations. The Tribune's comment took note of the 
allegedly anti-Chinese remarks made by Suharto at the time of the 
Aichi visit and went on to criticize the Suharto's government's 
"utter isolation" in world affairs ("in the same category as the 
Chiang Kai-shek bandit clique, Park Jung-Hee and the more die-
hard Latin American dictators"), since other nations had 
recognized that the PRC could not be ignored, and that no 
international problem could be solved without her. 51 The Tribune's 
comment also repudiated what has, in fact, been a frequent theme 
in official Indonesian statements on relations with Peking, i.e., 
that the PRC is continously meddling in internal Indonesian 
50. "Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality," Indonesian 
Tribune, vol. 6, 1972, no. 4, p. 14. 
51. "Suharto's Anti-China Policy Reveals his Regime's Utter Isolation," 
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 6, 1972, no. 4, p. 14. 
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affairs, including aiding subversives. According to the Tribune, 
the PRC has always been guided in its foreign relations by the 
principle of peaceful coexistence and has never interfered in the 
affairs of others. However, China "will faithfully uphold forever" 
the principle of support for liberation struggles all over the world, 
and hence "Suharto had better cast off his idle dream that China 
can be deterred from upholding this sacred principle."52 
As for the US, the pattern of its dominance in Suharto's 
Indonesia is considered to be total, according to the Maoists; in 
fact, Indonesia today is a "new type colony of US imperialism." 
Through joint investment with the Japanese, whose "growing 
economic expansionism in Indonesia" cheats Indonesian busi-
ness, bankrupts national monetary institutions, and dominates 
Indonesian marketing, the US is seen as forging strong shackles 
on Indonesian mining, on the development of fishing resources 
and sea transport, and on agriculture. All the natural resources of 
Indonesia, according to the Maoists, are being handed over by 
Suharto to foreign capital, "particularly that of US imperial-
ism."53 America is also committing "cultural aggression in 
Indonesia"; e.g. the Asia Society, a "Rockefeller owned private 
firm," is charged with shipping Indonesian art treasures to New 
York with the connivance of "Suharto and his fascist Minister of 
Culture," as meanwhile the CIA is hiring "many reactionary men 
of letters"; "reactionary" shadow-play artists are allegedly under 
orders from Suharto to present plays that defend "feudal 
oppression and exploitation." Higher education in Indonesia "has 
practically been affiliated to the American universities," and 
many of Suharto's officials are "all the offspring of American 
education."54 
Militarily and in international relations Suharto is accused by 
the Maoists of putting his armed forces "at the service of the 
'Nixon Doctrine,' " an apparent quid pro quo for the flow of US 
military equipment and supplies to the Indonesian services. 
Characteristic of Suharto's subservience, according to the Maoist 
view, is that "within days after US imperialism carried out 
aggression against Cambodia" (an apparent reference to the fall 
of the government of Norodom Sihanouk in March 1970) the 
52. Ibid. 
53. "Indonesia - A New Type of Colony of U.S. Imperialism," Indonesian 
Tribune, vol. 3, 1969, no. 1. pp. 20-25, and "Growning Japanese Economic 
Expansionism in Indonesia," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 8, 1974, no. 1, p. 13-17. 
54. Arita, "US Imperialist Cultural Aggression in Indonesia," Indonesian 
Tribune, vol. 4, 1970, no. 1, pp. 22-23. 
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Suharto government recognized the new Lon Nol government 
"and secretly sent a shipload of arms to Phnompenh." Subse-
quently, it is charged, Indonesia began giving military training to 
Lon Nol's military. Then, too, "acting upon the instructions of US 
imperialism," Indonesia is vigorously attempting to transform 
ASEAN into an Asian version of SEAT0.55 At the mid-1974 
Caracas conference of the United Nation on the Law of the Sea, 
Suharto officials by stressing the so-called acrhipelago principle 
(wawasan nusantara), whereby all the seas and waterways 
between the Indonesian islands are considered as falling within 
Indonesian territorial control, in fact attempted to safeguard the 
seabed and fishing interests already "pawned to and parceled out 
by foreign monopolies."56 
This overdrawn and highly schematized picture of Indone-
sia's current diplomacy ignores all the complexities of Indonesia's 
regional position, for example, its mediation efforts between 
Malaysia and the Philippines in the dispute over Sabah, or in the 
South Philippine Muslim uprising. It overlooks Djakarta's often 
unaasy realtionship with Japan, or the seemingly perpetual 
sanguinity of Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik that a 
normalization of Sino-Indonesian relations is but a matter of time, 
or, again, Indonesia's relations with the Middle Eastern and West 
European countries where China itself has friendly interests. 
Ignoring all these, then, in their foreign policy analyses, suggests 
that the Indonesian Maoists probably do not perceive the same 
significant tactical opportunities in the pragmatic pattern of the 
Suharto regimes international policies as in its domestic affairs. 
The Maoists are apparently preoccupied with changing Indone-
sia's "state power" through domestic tactics. With these tactics, 
that is, with the party's present tasks and the road it seeks to 
follow in changing Indonesia's government and society we may 
now be briefly concerned. 
III. 
"The way out" for Indonesia of its present problems, 
according to the earlier mentioned September 1966 otokritik of the 
Indonesian Maoists, is to raise and follow "three banners." The 
first banner is the building of a truly Marxist-Leninist party that 
is free from modern "revisionism," opportunism, and "subjecti-
55. "Suharto Puts his Army at the Service of the 'Nixon Doctrine'," 
Indonesian Tribune, vol. 5, 1971, no. 2, pp. 24-26. 
56. "The Caracas Conference and Suharto's Hypocrisy," Indonesian Tribune, 
vol. 8, 197 4, no. 3, p. 17. 
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vism." The second is espousal of "the armed people's struggle," 
the heart of which is the armed struggle of the peasantry in the 
context of and antifeudal revolution that is led by the "working 
class." Third, there is the need to build the "revolutionary united 
front," which is founded on the alliance between peasants and 
workers and, again, is led by the working class.57 
In a number of subsequent statements the Indonesian Maoists 
have elaborated these three major tactics. In November 1967, for 
example, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the 
Maoist PKI published a new program for the party. This new 
program emphasizes that "only through people's war" can the 
Indonesian people achieve their "liberation," and hence Indone-
sians must arm themselves and build a "people's armed force". 
The standard Maoist prescription of using a rural revolutionary 
base against the counter revolutionary cities is also offered here, 
and with the peasantry as the core of their forces the proposed 
Indonesian people's army" is directed to win victories "locality by 
locality" in the countryside, encircle the towns, and ultimately 
"liberate" the latter. The building of the "backward Indonesian 
villages" into "advanced" revolutionary base areas, according to 
this 1967 party program, is not only an urgent task for every 
Communist, but also for "every son and daughter of the 
Indonesian people" aspiring to free the nation. Building the 
united front means, therefore, also utilizing the potential of "all 
revolutionary classes and groups," not just the workers and the 
peasants but also the petty bourgeoisie (described as a "reliable 
ally" of the working class) and the "vacillating" national 
bourgeoisie. 58 
Again, in a statement by the "delegation" of Maoist PKI 
Central Committee, on the occasion of the party's fiftieth 
anniversary in 1970, the peasantry is extolled as the "most 
trusted" ally of the proletariat, and the PKI's past record in 
appreciating this role of the peasantry is decried. According to 
this statement it is "true" that during the 1951-65 period the PKI 
"formulated" that the peasantry was the main force of the 
Revolution, and that the "working class" had to establish an 
alliance with it. However, it is alleged, despite this formulation, 
that the PKI in practice did not encourage the peasants to develop 
57. Build the PKI Along the Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit., p. 199. 
58. "The Programme of the Communist Party of Indonesia for People's 
Democracy in Indonesia (November 1967)," pp. 235·280, in Build the PKI Along the 
Marxist-Leninist Line, op. cit. 
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their armed struggle, establish revolutionary bases in the country, 
or struggle for political power. Therefore, today, the PKI must give 
new leadership to the rural masses, and only by relying on the 
peasantry, particularly on the working and poor peasants, can the 
PKI and the proletariat lead the peasants "in a protracted guerilla 
struggle."59 Apropos the above critique, one might perhaps 
observe in passing that D.N. Aidit, the PKI's major executive and 
theoretician during most of the now criticized 1951-65 period, 
acknowledged the peasantry, especially the poor peasants, to be 
"the biggest force driving the revolution onward," and urged the 
peasants to undertake militant "unilateral actions" (aski se{ihak), 
including the forceable seizing of land from landlords in 1964. 
Nevertheless, admittedly, there is controversy as to whether 
subsequently Aidit wholly conformed to the Sukarno regime's 
pressures for moderation, or, indeed, had, or had not, embarked on 
a final drive to seize power in Indonesia. 60 
In keeping with the Maoists' doctrinal emphasis on the 
necessity of violent struggle, relatively obscure clashes have been 
singled out in the Indonesian Maoist media as landmarks in the 
developing "people's war" in the country and thus as models to be 
emulated for future action. An attack on the small Indonesian 
military air base at Singkawang, West Kalimantan (Borneo) 
province on July 17, 1967, by about fifty Communist insurgents, 
some Indonesians and others from Sarawak's previously men-
tioned "North Kalimantan People's Guerilla Forces," is now 
described as the "successful first shot against the facist military 
regime" of Suharto. From this the armed struggle is said to have 
spread to other islands of Indonesia. Describing the nature of this 
supposedly developing "people's" struggle, one Indonesian Maoist 
account said that61 : 
"The base of operations for the people's armed forces usually 
lies in the mountainous districts. In many villages guerilla 
detachments and self-defense corps have been organised. 
59. "People of Indonesia Unite Under the Leadership of the Communist Party 
of Indonesia Surmount Every Difficulty and Continue to March Forward 
Courageously Along the Road of Armed Revolution," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 4, 
1970, no. 2, pp. 6-13. 
60. Cf. D.N. Aidit's essay, "Masjarakat Indonesia dan Revolusi Indonesia," 
pp. 292-293, in his Collected Works, Pilihan Tulisan, op. cit., vol. 2. On the 
controversy over the PKI's militancy, see J.M. van der Kroef, "Origins of the 1965 
Coup in Indonesia: Probabilities and Alternatives," Journal of Southeast Asian 
Studies, September 1972, pp. 277-298. 
61. "Singkawant- Brilliant Episode in the Armed Struggle of the Indonesian 
People," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 3, 1969, no. 3, pp. 3-6. 
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Young men and women from among the masses of farm 
laborers and poor peasants form the bulk of these forces. In 
some villages guerilla detachments consisting solely of 
women fighters have been formed .... In villages around 
Tjileduk, West Java, the masses of peasants burning with 
class hatred, have executed a number of exceptionally 
notorious landlords. In other places of West Java, at about 
the same time, the peasants organised themselves and 
launched the struggle to win back their lands which were 
grabbed by reactionary authorities and landlords." 
The foregoing account was published in 1968. The Tjileduk 
incident and some like it did, in fact, take place in various 
localities in Java. But today the "brilliant" example of the 
Singkawang episode is being emulated only by about 200 badly 
disorganised Maoist insurgents operating mostly in Sarawak's 
interior and frontier zones, while in Indonesian West Kalimantan 
or in other Indonesian islands, the "people's war" is at present 
largely a rhethorical conceit. 
Despite the insurgents' obvious inability to confront effec-
tively the Suharto government's currently extensive police powers 
and security apparatus, the Maoist "Delegation" of the PKI's 
Central Committee unceasingly emphasizes the dangers in 
following the "peaceful" road, the "Parliamentary road." Such a 
"parliamentary" path it ascribes, not surprisingly, to the Moscow-
oriented PKI undergrounds and exiles, accusing them of seeking 
to attain a new legal status for the party in the context of a future 
"national democratic" government. One such accusation has had 
a particular reference to a 1969 policy statement of the Pro-
Moscow group called "Urgent Tasks of the Communist Movement 
in Indonesia," which, in tum, included an attack on the Maoists' 
1966 otokritik. In the "Urgent Tasks" document of the Moscow 
oriented PKI group "new tactics" are called for, to be based on the 
principle that "it would be premature to launch armed action 
before the completion of the painstaking revolutionary work of a 
preparatory nature" and before the emergence of a "clea:cut 
revolutionary crisis." To be sure, "military cadres" must also be 
assembled, and secret weapons caches must be prepared for 
eventual "armed action," but all this must be done along with 
"political work among the masses," for without a "mass political 
arm" an armed rising would not be effective. The rehabilitation 
and restoration of the PKI among the masses, in particular, is 
thus an essential first step. The basic strategy for Communists to 
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follow, according to the "Urgent Tasks" statement, is to work in 
favor of a change in the "balance of political forces" in favor of 
the working people, "so that an anti-imperialist democratic 
national government" can be established.6 2 
The significance of "national democracy" (and its offshoots 
and variations like "new democracy" and "people's democracy") 
as a tactic used by Communist parties, including the Chinese, 
toward completion of an eventual "socialist" revolution need not 
here be emphasized. 5 3 There is little question that in other parts of 
Southeast Asia today, e.g., in the Philippines and Thailand, the 
pro-Moscow Communist underground is also seeking to legitimize 
itself in a new nationalistic context in the region where there is 
diminished direct American influence and looming Soviet power, 
by stressing its "peaceful" and parliamentary approach and its 
identification with "left" or "progressive" intellectual circles, and 
with other groups which for economic and political reasons are 
similarly critical of the prevailing regime, thus contributing to 
and hopefully benefiting from an eventual liberalization of that 
regime.64 Such an approach remains anathema to the Indonesian 
Maoists, however. The advocacy of the "parliamentary road" and 
of the "national democratic" tactic not only sidetracks the 
revolution of Indonesia itself, in the Maoist view, but further 
enables the Soviet "social imperialists" to continue their economic 
collaboration with the Suharto regime and with US imperialism 
generally. The power that is sought by the PKI, in the "Urgent 
Tasks" document according to the Indonesian Maoists, is 
therefore merely the perpetuation of bourgeoisie power.65 "Na-
tional democracy" as a tactical concept thus seems conceptually 
linked by the Indonesian Maoists to the period of "revisionism" in 
the PKI, when the party was led by Aidit in the 1950's and early 
1960's, and when the PKI's alleged accommodation of "bourgeois" 
interests led to its Gestapu debacle. 
Even so, in the building of the "revolutionary united front," as 
required by the otokritik's "third banner" directive, the Indone-
sian Maoists have an appreciative eye for new revolutionary 
62. "Urgent Tasks of the Communist Movement in Indonesia," Information 
Bulletin, 1969, no. 7 (143), pp. 23-42. 
63. See Justus M. van der Kroef, "On National Democracy," Survey (London), 
April 1963, pp. 134-145, and "The Communist Concept of National Democracy," 
Studies on the Soviet Union, vol. 4, 1964, no. 2, pp. 39-63. 
64. See, e.g., Justus M. van der Kroef, "Philippine Communist Theory and 
Strategy. A New Departure?," Pacific Affairs, Summer 1975, pp. 181-198. 
65. "Expose Modem Revisionists' New Plot to Split the PKI," Indonesian 
Tribune, vol. 4, 1970, pp. 35-37. 
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social potentials. Even before the violent, largely student-led 
demonstrations in Djakarta in mid-January 1974, during the visit 
of Japanese Premier Kakuei Tanaka, Indonesian Maoist state-
ments had underscored the economic plight of Indonesian 
students ("swelling ranks of the diploma-holding unemployed"), 
as at the same time the cost of advanced education in Indonesia 
allegedly was said to be placing it beyond the reach of all but the 
wealthier parents.66 Mter the January 1974 incident, which 
Maoist media described as reflecting the "discontent of the broad 
masses of the people" toward the Suharto regime's policies of 
submission of the Indonesian economy to US and Japanese 
imperialism, special emphasis was placed on the role of the 
"masses of students and youth," who, along with the rest of the 
Indonesian people, would surely "sum up their experiences," 
discredit unworthy leaders, and strongly commit themselves to 
the cause of liberation.67 While, on the one hand, this emphasis on 
the important role of students and youth in Indonesia is in 
keeping with similar stress on the importance of the revolutionary 
activism of youth to be found in current Communist party 
directives in the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand, on the other 
hand the volatile nature of youth action (after all students during 
1965-67 spearheaded the downfall of President Sukamo under 
whose policies the PKI reached its greatest expansion and 
influence in its history) must give some pause - never more so 
than to theorists familiar with the "summing up" of the Chinese 
party and its experiences in the "Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution". 
Ultimately, therefore, the building of a disciplined party, 
"armed with Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tse-Tung Thought," indeed 
a party whose members are committed to studying "assiduously" 
Mao Tse-Tung Thought as "the acme of Marxism-Leninism in the 
present era," remains the most important and "first banner" 
which the Indonesian Communists can raise. The correct 
ideological training of such a party, its strict but smoothly 
functioning hierarchy, the need for all party members to reject 
firmly all appeals of "revisionism" and opportunism that may 
sway them from their revolutionary course - these, at bottom, are 
the indispensible conditions of the Indonesian Communist 
movement's revival today, as the Maoists see it. The Indonesian 
66. Karman, "Student Resistance Against the Fascist Regime," Indonesian 
Tribune, vol. 6, 1972, no. 2, pp. 12-14. 
67. "People of Indonesia Unite to Win Democracy and Liberty!," Indonesian 
Tribune, vol. 8, 1974, no. 2, p. 5. 
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environment today offers a challenge and a promise to the party 
in this respect, for what is happening in the nation (one reads in 
another analysis) is an "extremely interesting" struggle ''between 
well-fed and ill-fed dogs, between big dogs and small dogs."68 
While to outsiders a perception of Indonesia's internal problems is 
perhaps not best expressed in terms of a canine conflict, existing 
contradictions in the country are viewed by the Maoists as 
"useful," and as affording an opportunity "to further promote" the 
armed struggle to overthrow the Suharto government. 
68. "The Indonesian Marxist-Leninists Rebuild Their Party with the Chinese 
Communist Party as the Model," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 3, 1969, pp. 11-18, and 
"A Fight Between Well-Fed Dogs and lll-Fed Dogs," Indonesian Tribune, vol. 3, 
1969, p. 42. 
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